Voluntary Society - Conditioning - Federal Reserve
Voices from the French Revolution by John A. Pugsley
Hegel, the renowned philosopher, wrote in his book
"The Philosophy of History" back in 1832 that "what experience and
history teach is this — people and governments never have learned
anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it."
That unfortunate truth is why the story you are about to hear is so
important, for it is the story of your future.
As we begin the 1990's, the nation appears to be on the brink of an
economic abyss. Recession is enveloping the nation's economy. Inflation
is rising. Stock, bond and real estate prices are falling. Business and
consumer debt are at an all-time high, and defaults are rising
ominously. Our financial system is weak and in imminent danger.
Hundreds of banks, savings & loans, and insurance companies are
failing each year, and hundreds more are on the verge of collapse.
Meanwhile, our politicians pontificate, point fingers, hurl accusations
at one another, but ultimately stand together on the fundamental
issues. They call for lower interest rates, monetary easing. They push
forward an ever-growing list of government regulations and programs.
While they pretend to be appalled by government spending, under their
votes it rises steadily, year after year, decade after decade. As a
consequence, we suffer higher and higher taxes and an expanding torrent
of government debt.
Your goal is economic survival. To achieve this, you must either be
extremely lucky, or you must correctly anticipate the future, and steer
your business and investment plans accordingly. Your challenge is to
make sense out of a deluge of conflicting information and opinion.
This is why you should pay particular attention to the events that
occurred two centuries ago in revolutionary France.
My introduction to the economic events surrounding the French
Revolution came through a small book by an American diplomat, professor
and college president named Andrew Dickson White. A man of eclectic
knowledge and interests, he was, among other things, a student of
history, and particularly of the history of the period surrounding the
In the mid-1890s, White became increasingly concerned for the economic
future of the United States. Political pressure was mounting in the
country for the expansion of the money supply as a means of stimulating
economic growth. To show the fallacy of such a course, White prepared a
paper, which he read to a group of Senators and Representatives in
Subsequently published under the title "Paper-Money Inflation in
France," White's trenchant paper has been reprinted numerous times, and
is still available as a small book entitled "Fiat-Money Inflation in
The work described in detail the political, economic, and monetary
events that occurred in France during the 1790s; events that culminated
in one of history's most infamous economic upheavals: the Great
hyperinflation of the French Revolution.Let me share with you a few of
the more pertinent details.
When the Revolution began in 1789, the economy of France was in serious
depression. The year before, in 1788, a severe drought hit the
agricultural areas of the continent. Then, in the fall, a hailstorm,
raging from Normandy to Champagne, destroyed or severely damaged crops
along 180 miles of usually fertile terrain. As though this was not
sufficient, the winter of 1788-89 was the most severe in the century,
only to be followed in the spring of 1789 by disastrous floods. By
summer famine threatened every province.
The French government found itself in an impossible situation.The
monetary unit of the time was the French franc, which was convertible
into specific weights of gold and silver. Both gold and silver coins,
denominated in francs, circulated as the medium of exchange.
The government was broke, and deeply in debt.
On the one hand, it was faced with a rising public clamor for action to
alleviate the economic distress of the nation. On the other hand it was
The famine conditions had inflamed public anger, and a general tax
revolt ensued. Taxes became impossible to collect. Yet the only other
source of revenue — borrowing, seemed impossible. Since the government
had been unable to meet its prior debt obligations, its credit had been
destroyed. Unable to create gold or silver out of thin air, the
government found itself in a state of economic paralysis.
Some members of the French National Assembly argued that the problems
facing business were the result of a lack of money. After all, it was
evident that no one had enough. Sales were down, business was stagnant,
and the economy was moribund. It seemed to follow that the financial
woes of the country could be alleviated if only there was more money in
the hands of the people. Money would encourage people to spend;
spending would encourage both investment and production. Increased
production would mean taxes could be collected again, and this, in
turn, would solve the mounting debts of the government.
A plan was proposed in the Assembly whereby the government would
stimulate the economy by the issuance of a new government monetary
instrument to be called the "Assignat." The Assignat, which literally
translated means "assignment," was essentially a government IOU,
denominated in francs. Since the government had no gold or silver with
which to back this new issue, it was to be backed by government land;
specifically, the lands that had been confiscated from the church.
Assignats were interest-bearing government securities. As they were
backed with state lands, they could be used, if the bearer so chose, to
make down payments in the purchase of property. But as the more astute
knew at the time, the issuance of paper IOUs was, in reality, simply an
issue of irredeemable paper money.
Not all members of the French Assembly were in favor of a scheme to
solve France's economic problems through expansion of the money supply,
as memories lingered of a period some seventy years earlier when the
money creation schemes of John Law had brought France to hyperinflation
and financial ruin.
As Andrew Dickson White put it, "In John Law's day, the French had
learned how easy it is to issue paper currency; how difficult it is to
check its overissue; how seductively it leads to the absorption of the
means of the workingmen and men of small fortunes; how heavily it falls
on all those living on fixed incomes, salaries or wages; how securely
it creates on the ruins of the prosperity of all men of meagre means a
class of debauched speculators, the most injurious class that a nation
can harbor… how it stimulates overproduction at first and leaves every
industry flaccid afterward; how it breaks down thrift and develops
political and social immorality."
One French legislator, the famous orator and revolutionist Mirabeau,
spoke of paper money as "A nursery of tyranny, corruptions and
delusion; a veritable debauch of authority in delirium." He called the
issue of such notes "a loan to an armed robber," and said of it: "that
infamous word, paper money, ought to be banished from our language."
Mirabeau was not alone. One anonymous pamphlet read before the Assembly
clearly defined the specific dangers of paper money: "increasing the
quantity of money or substitutes for money in a nation increases
prices, disturbs values, alarms capital, diminishes legitimate
enterprise, and so decreases the demand both for products and for
labor; the only people to be helped by it are the rich who have large
debts to pay." It was signed merely "A Friend of the People" but after
it was read, none other than Du Pont de Nemours claimed authorship.
In spite of these warnings, the popular support for a painless answer
to the business slump was overwhelming. In April, 1790, the Assembly
decreed that the state would sell four hundred million livres — the
livre being the equivalent value of one pound of silver — in paper
notes, in the form of Assignats bearing interest at the rate of three
percent per annum.
To explain the advantages of the new currency, the Assembly issued an
address to the French people. In this address it spoke of the nation as
"delivered by this grand means from all uncertainty and from all
ruinous result of the credit system." It predicted that this issue
"would bring back into the public treasury, into commerce, and into all
branches of industry strength, abundance and prosperity."
To quell the cries of the opposition that this would open Pandora's
box, and start an endless chain of paper currency issues, the Assembly
agreed that the issue would be limited to 400 million livres, and that
would be the end of it. No more could be issued. After all, all they
needed to do was prime the pump. Once business and commerce revived, it
would run on its own.
What happened? The first result of the issue was exactly what its
proponents promised. The pressure was off the treasury; a portion of
the public debt was paid; creditors were encouraged and were willing to
extend new credit; ordinary expenses were met, and, since a large
quantity of the new paper money found its way into the hands of the
consumers and businesses, trade increased. All in all, the economic
difficulties of the country seemed to vanish.
The euphoria was brief. Within five months after the issue the
government had spent the money, and although there had been a brief
business resurgence, the economy quickly turned into the doldrums, and
then into recession. Both the business sector and the government were
again in trouble. It was only natural that the same Assembly quickly
turned again to the panacea: further issues of Assignats. And again
they promised that this would be the last. They would raise the limit
just this one more time.
The Assembly duly declared that the total issue could never exceed some
amount slightly above the current issue. Limitation after limitation
The issues of irredeemable government IOUs followed one after another,
and while each issue seemed to temporarily alleviate the problems, the
periods of relief became shorter and shorter. As paper money increased
in quantity, prosperity steadily diminished, and as new issues of
Assignats occurred, the depreciation in the purchasing power of the
The first issue of 400 million Assignats occurred in April, 1790. By
the end of 1794, less than five years later, seven billion were in
circulation. By the end of May, 1795, five months later, circulation
was increased to 10 billion; at the end of July, just one month later,
it jumped to 14 billion.
Meanwhile, the value of the paper currency relative to gold and silver
coins fell steadily. One gold franc would buy 25 paper francs, then
thirty, then fifty. By February, 1796, one gold franc was worth 288
paper francs. A few months later, 600. Meanwhile, commodities prices in
gold or silver francs remained stable, while prices in paper francs
rose proportionately to the rise in gold and silver.
The government did everything within its power to stop the depreciation
of the new currency. It promised, it cajoled, it threatened. It passed
ever more severe laws in a vain effort to force the public to accept
and value the ever depreciating Assignats.It passed price control laws.
It passed currency exchange laws. It passed laws making it illegal to
take currency out of the country. It made the ownership of gold and
silver illegal. Anyone twice convicted of buying or selling paper money
at less than its face value could be sentenced to twenty years in
prison. Investing in foreign securities brought the guillotine.
Eventually, it became a crime punishable by death to even ask at the
beginning of a transaction what type of money you were to be paid with
— new issues, old issues, coins, etc.
In the midst of all this the steady action of a simple
economic principle could be observed. No matter how severe the penalty,
people would not accept the paper Assignats at the legal exchange rate.
No matter what the government decreed, the Assignats continued to fall
in value. Price inflation could not be controlled — not by promises,
not by urgings, not by threats, and not by force.And even as the
results of the ever-increasing issues of government IOUs wreaked havoc
on the nation, the source of the problem was not recognized.
Andrew Dickson White also observed that "in spite of these evident
results of too much currency, the old cry of a 'Scarcity of circulating
medium' was not stilled; it appeared not long after each issue, no
matter how large.
"But every thoughtful student of financial history knows that this cry
always comes after such issues — nay, that it must come, —
because in obedience to a natural law, the former scarcity, or rather
insufficiency of currency recurs just as soon as prices become adjusted
to the new volume, and there comes some little revival of business with
the usual increase of credit."
And so the expansion of government debt and the money supply rolled on.
The price inflation that followed the expansion of the money supply was
only one visible symptom of the destructive nature of this insidious
monetary fraud. There were many other ways in which the expansion of
paper money ripped apart the French society.One of those was the
obliteration of thrift from the minds of the French people. Until then,
hard work and thrift had characterized the French people.
With such masses of money flowing through their hands, and with such
uncertainty as to its future value, the ordinary motives for saving
evaporated. Why save if inflation destroys the purchasing power of your
savings? Why not buy the things you need and want now, before they go
up in price?
As White phrased it, as the idea of thrift died, a "loose luxury"
spread throughout the country.
An even worse side-effect was the explosion of speculation. To quote
White, "With the flood of paper currency in 1791 appeared the first
evidences of that cancerous disease which always follows large issues
of irredeemable currency, — a disease more permanently injurious to a
nation than war, pestilence or famine. At the great metropolitan
centers grew a luxurious, speculative, stock-gambling body, which, like
a malignant tumor, absorbed into itself the strength of the nation and
sent out its cancerous fibres to the remotest hamlets. At these city
centers abundant wealth seemed to be piled up: in the country at large
there grew a dislike of steady labor and a contempt for moderate gains
and simple living."
The effect was not surprising. What naturally happens to a person's
incentive to work hard and save money when he sees his neighbor make a
lifetime's wages in a week in the stock or commodities markets? Why be
prudent and debt-free, when all around you were getting rich by
borrowing, speculating, and paying back their loans in depreciating
In fact, it was the very growth of credit that fed the demand for
credit. As the paper-money inflation destroyed the value of savings and
rewarded those who went in debt by allowing them to repay their debts
with rapidly depreciating paper currency, it gave birth to a vast
debtor class, which was directly interested in the further depreciation
of the currency.
The nucleus of this class was formed by those who had purchased the
church lands from the government with small down payments. The creation
of easy credit for mortgages, coupled with an inflation that reduced
the real costs of servicing those mortgages, created an artificial
demand for property that drove property prices up. And rising property
values gave birth to another far more influential class of debtors: the
speculators, who found that leveraging into rising nominal values was a
fast way to amass great wealth.Before long, the debtor class became a
political special interest group, which extended through every level of
society. From the stock-speculator who sat in the Assembly to the small
land-speculator in the rural districts; from the sleek inventor of puts
and calls on the Paris Exchange to the lying stockbroker in the small
town; all lobbied vigorously for new issues of paper money.But couldn't
even the most blind see that the issues of government IOUs were causing
the hyperinflation? Strangely, they could or would not.
Although both historical evidence and economic laws proved that money
creation must result in rising prices, the proponents of government
borrowing brushed these aside, arguing that "the laws of political
economy, however applicable in other times, are not applicable to this
particular period." Argument after argument was brought forth to
explain why this time it was all right to issue more currency or why
this time it wasn't the new money that was causing prices to rise.
One such ingenious argument stated it thusly, and I quote: "Your
committee are thoroughly persuaded that the amount of the circulating
medium before the Revolution was greater than that of the Assignats
today: but at that time the money circulated slowly and now it passes
rapidly so that one thousand million Assignats do the work of two
thousand millions of specie."
Thus, the advocates of larger government deficits in France in the
1790s claimed that price inflation was somehow a result of the number
of times the money changed hands, rather than the result of the total
quantity of money in circulation. Today we hear the same argument as
economists claim that money "velocity" is an uncontrollable factor that
supersedes money quantity.Ultimately, White noted, a new idea took hold
of the populace, — the idea that the ordinary needs of government could
be legitimately met wholly by the means of paper currency; taxes could
be dispensed with. "As a result," he wrote, "it was found that the
Assignat printing press was the one resource left to the government,
and the increase in the volume of paper money became every day more
The End of the Fraud
Eventually, the game could go on no longer. New issues of currency were
met with derision, and depreciated before they even entered the system.
White summarized the Great French Inflation in these words: "It came by
seeking a remedy for a comparatively small evil in an evil infinitely
more dangerous. To cure a disease temporary in its character, a
corrosive poison was administered, which ate out the vitals of French
"It progressed according to a law in social physics which we may call
the "law of accelerating issue and depreciation." It was comparatively
easy to refrain from the first issue; it was exceedingly difficult to
refrain from the second; to refrain from the third and those following
was practically impossible."It brought, as we have seen, commerce and
manufactures, the mercantile interest, the agricultural interest, to
ruin. It brought on these the same destruction which would come to a
Hollander opening the dykes of the sea to irrigate his garden in a dry
summer. It ended in the complete financial, moral and political
prostration of France.... "
And, White concludes, "There is a lesson in all this which it behooves
every thinking man to ponder." Indeed, there is.
Although you probably don't need any help in grasping the incredible
parallels between the situation in France in 1790 and the United States
in 1990, let us walk through them together. In pre-revolutionary
France, government spending exceeded tax revenues, as they do today in
the U.S. The French politicians were powerless to raise taxes, as are
our politicians, today. In both cases, demands for government services
and subsidies force the politicians to spend, but the ballot box makes
it politically impossible to raise taxes to meet these expenditures.
In France, the government was unable to back its IOUs with gold and
silver, and therefore these were removed as backing for the currency.
New government IOUs were issued in the form of Assignats, which were to
be backed by newly confiscated land. These IOUs soon drove gold and
silver coins out of circulation. At a point, gold and silver were
outlawed for monetary use, and Assignats were made the only legal
In the U.S. today, the government issues Treasury IOUs backed only by
its own taxing power. These large IOUs are then monetized by the
Federal Reserve, a process in which the Fed purchases them and issues
Federal Reserve Notes in payment. In every practical sense, Treasury
Bills, Notes, Bonds, Federal Reserve Notes are the equivalent of French
The Federal Reserve
Andrew Dickson White's pamphlet was written at the end of the 19th
Century, when there was strong pressure by business and banking
interests for an expansion of the U.S. money supply. But popular
support was hard to muster. Just as many older French citizens in 1790
had bitter memories of the hyperinflation in John Law's time, some 70
years earlier, many Americans still had memories of the Continental
Dollar inflation of the American Revolution, as well as the Greenback
inflation during the Civil War. And, just as the French government
found it hard to borrow without the gold or silver to repay the loans,
so the U.S. government was unable to borrow significant sums in the
U.S. bond markets. If the government borrowed, it had to have the gold
or silver to repay the loans. Thus, both federal spending and federal
debt had remained nearly level for almost the entire 19th century.
Just as the politicians in the French Assembly struggled to find a way
to sell paper money creation to the public, and succeeded through the
ploy of selling "Assignats," so the U.S. politicians and their
supporters found an even more devious way to make an end run around the
monetary restraints of a gold-backed currency.
Our politicians and the big banking interests came up with the idea of
the Federal Reserve System. Created ostensibly to protect the public
from "panics" and bank failures, in truth its purpose was to provide an
open-ended source of credit to the U.S. government, just as the
Assignats provided one to the French assembly. Congress gave the Fed
monopoly power over the issuance of U.S. currency in the form of
Federal Reserve Notes. Initially, like private banknotes, the new
Federal Reserve Notes were convertible into gold or silver. However,
the reserves of gold that the Fed had to hold were dramatically lower
than those commonly held by private banks. Thus, the Fed could expand
note issue initially, without fear of a run on its reserves. The
dramatic expansion of credit that this new system allowed resulted in a
dramatic increase in the money supply during the 1920s, an enormous
business and speculative boom (the roaring twenties), and the ultimate
contraction of that boom created a run on the gold reserves of the
private banks. It was that run caused the massive bank failures of the
1930s, and which the U.S. government met by outlawing the ownership of
Just as the Assignats provided the French government with spending
power, the Federal Reserve Act gave U.S. politicians a source for
borrowing, and thereby the opportunity to increase government spending.
This solved the problem of financing the U.S. entry into World War I,
and created an immediate economic boom. But in the same way that the
first issue of Assignats at first stimulated a business recovery, which
was immediately followed by a contraction, so the paper-money boom of
the twenties quickly led to the contraction of the Great Depression.
When the new credit expansion began to collapse, the public tried to
turn away from the new flat money being issued by the Federal Reserve,
and back to the gold they were used to using as money. They went to
their banks and began withdrawing gold. Since Federal Reserve
activities had allowed banks to expand their issues of banknotes and
loans far beyond the gold reserves of the banks, the initial run on the
banks started a chain reaction of bank failures. The government met
this problem by taking the same action that the French Assembly did in
the 1790s: it outlawed the use of gold as money, and demanded that it
all be turned over to the government.
The Problem: A Lack of
In revolutionary France, proponents of money creation argued that a
stagnant economy could be revived by increasing the "circulating
medium." The idea that a nation's financial problems have roots in a
lack of money is an age-old fallacy, but it is nevertheless as popular
today as it was in 1790 France.
Today, the concept is wrapped in slightly different words. Today the
Administration, Congress, the business community, and consumers all cry
out for the Fed to lower interest rates. The demand is for the Fed to
"ease" credit in order to forestall a recession. But the only tool the
Fed has for reducing interest rates, or "easing" is to expand the money
supply. They must increase bank reserves by turning those previously
issued Treasury IOUs into circulating currency.
The demand for lower interest rates or easier credit is purely and
simply a call for an increase in the quantity of money in circulation,
and by implication argues that economic recessions are the result of a
lack of money.
Just as the members of the French National Assembly argued that more
circulating medium would encourage people to invest, produce, and solve
the mounting debts of government, so our political leaders, at the
behest of business and banking interests, do the same.When Reagan
proposed his radical new "supply-side" program, he was merely dusting
off the old theory presented by the paper-money advocates in the French
Assembly, who promised to pull the country out of the economic slump
through a program of government borrowing and spending that was
supposed to stimulate production and thus balance the federal budget.
In revolutionary France, the creation of money appeared to alleviate
the economic recession, but soon the stimulus wore off and a bigger
issue was needed.
In the U.S. the argument has always been that a prudent and
conservative Federal Reserve Board would control growth of the money
supply and not allow politicians to get their hands on the money
creation mechanism. The growth of money and of the price level since
1913 clearly shows the fallacy of this argument. Federal Reserve
chairmen constantly reiterate the Fed's commitment to stable prices,
and assure us that the Fed considers containment of monetary growth to
be its prime priority. Yet whenever recession threatens, they turn on
the presses, and the money rolls into the banks.
Just as the French Assembly always opted in favor of greater issues
whenever the economy slowed, so the Fed always has, and always will,
choose to expand the money supply whenever recession threatens the
Likewise, just as the French Assembly, with each new issue of debt,
promised that this issue was the last, U.S. politicians set limit after
limit on the federal debt, then immediately override their own limits.
They pass law after law to balance the federal budget (such as the
Gramm-Rudman Hollingsworth bill) and immediately subvert the purpose of
the laws by all manner of accounting trickery. And why do they do this?
They are responding to the immense political clout of the debtor class.
In revolutionary France, the continuing debauchery of the currency
eventually resulted in the creation of a debtor class that had a vested
interest in further depreciation of the currency. As White pointed out,
a large segment of these debtors were land speculators with property
The pressure on politicians to increase government spending and on the
Federal Reserve to expand the money supply rises each time a recession
threatens. This pressure comes directly from debtors who will be thrust
into default if their income streams are interrupted. As was the case
in France, the largest group of debtors are real estate investors and
speculators, who benefit if they can pay off their mortgages with
cheaper dollars, and who, on the other hand, will lose everything if
real estate prices drop significantly. Since real estate is most
vulnerable to rising interest rates, the political pressure for lower
rates is intense. Lower rates come from only one source: money creation.
In revolutionary France, the idea that the needs of government could be
met wholly by means of borrowing or currency creation took possession
of the nation. Taxes were unpopular, difficult to collect, and could be
The Laffer Curve, which purports to show that reducing taxes stimulates
business activity, became a rallying symbol for the supply-side
economists who offered tax-rate cuts as the brilliant new idea for the
The cry for lower taxes to stimulate economic activity is not a new and
profound economic theory: it is the same dusty and discredited idea
that was argued before the French Assembly 200 years ago. Tax cuts
would certainly be beneficial to the economy, but only if government
spending drops by the same amount. When tax revenue is merely replaced
by more government borrowing, it leads to economic disaster, as was
proven in France.
Even as you listen to this, lobbyists are furiously pressuring federal
politicians for further tax cuts, and those politicians are struggling
to find ways to comply. Yet federal spending is on the rise. I wonder
how long it will be before some politician will stand up and demand an
abolition of all taxes. It can't be long in coming.Two hundred years
ago, there was a long and detailed history proving that money creation
always resulted in inflation, and eventually the destruction of the
economy it was supposed to help. In revolutionary France, proponents of
money creation ignored the evidence of history and the theoretical
arguments. They claimed that the laws of political economy that might
have applied to earlier times were not applicable to their period.
Today in the U.S., politicians and economists brush off warnings that
continued growth of federal debt and the money supply must eventually
touch off a price explosion. None other than Fed Chairman Alan
Greenspan, as knowledgeable an economist as has ever graced the Chair,
stated (in reference to the fact that money growth in the first half of
the 1980s had not resulted in price inflation) that "the old economic
relationships no longer seem to apply."
The Age of Speculation
Perhaps the most significant social effect of money creation that was
felt in revolutionary France was the effect it had on the public's
sense of thrift, prudence, and investment. The continual injections of
printing-press money and the concomitant price spiral punished those
who saved, and rewarded those who gambled.
The vivid descriptions in Andrew Dickson White's book of the
speculative markets in 18th-Century France could be descriptions of our
own investment markets. Speculation has replaced long-term investment.
Investment profits have superseded earned income as the return of
choice. The person who practices thrift, saves his money, and pays cash
for the necessities and luxuries of life is considered ignorant and
old-fashioned. The big money is made not through thrift, but through
speculation — leveraged corporate buyouts, takeovers, borrowing in real
estate, margining stocks, and leveraging positions in stocks, bonds,
and commodities through options and futures contracts. An ever-growing
flood of new and more speculative financial instruments spring into the
broker's portfolios. The financial pages grow, and the fever rises.
What is not understood is that these "new" investment vehicles and
devices are not the result of a normal, healthy evolution of investment
markets based on the latest knowledge and modern technology. They are
the deformed offspring of fiat-money inflation in the twentieth century.
The economic problems of today are not new, and they are not unique.
They are the effects of society's inability to learn from history, or
to act on principles deduced from it. Our problems are manifestations
of the truth of the economic law that has been known since the days of
Rome: paper money does not cure a country's economic problems, it
causes them. The expanding, irredeemable issues of federal debt are the
foundation for all of the ills of our economy, just as the Assignat
issues were for revolutionary France.You are living through a period
that will be written about by scholars and economic historians for
centuries to come. As your descendants browse through "Fiat-Money
Inflation in America" two hundred years from now, will they be able to
say, my family saw it coming, and prospered in spite of it? If you
listen to and take heed of the Voices from the French Revolution,
perhaps they may.
A paperback copy of Andrew Dickson White's book, Fiat-Money Inflation
in France, is available for $4.50 plus $1.95 postage and handling from
Laissez Faire Books, 942 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94103. Call,
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